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Edification from the Andorran Model: A Brief
Exploration into the Condominium Solution
on the International Stage and Its Potential
Application to Current Land Disputes
TAYLOR CALVIN PERKINS*
ABSTRACT
This note explores the international legal concept of the
condominium solution and its current manifestation under the Andorran
political system. It endeavors to come to a working definition of
condominium, before embarking on a survey of condominiums
throughout history. The note then chronicles the history of Andorra and
the genesis of the Andorran condominium, and then analyzes the current
Andorran constitution and the influence of the condominium within the
document. Lastly, the paper explores why Andorra has been able to
remain a condominium for over eight centuries, before finally
ruminating on the optimistic future of condominium solutions in
international law.
INTRODUCTION
In the insatiable rush for land and resources in the European
colonial expansion of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, an
ancient international legal concept was revived as a means of dealing
with disputed territories between two sovereign nations.' Known as the
condominium solution, it was a territorial modus vivendi, allowing for
two sovereign states to equally govern a disputed territory. However,
this model would fall into disfavor by legal and political theorists in the
twentieth century, as the Westphalian conception of a territory being
absolutely sovereign became heralded as the paramount characteristic
* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D., 2014, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law.
1. See D. P. O'Connell, The Condominium of the New Hebrides, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
71, 77 (1968).
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of the nation-state. 2 Consequently, despite the vast array of seemingly
perennial conflicts between two states over disputed territories in the
world today,3 the condominium solution is continually overlooked or
dismissed by political scholars as a viable solution to these issues.4 The
condominium solution remains an endangered concept in the political
realm, almost entirely absent on the world stage today, save for the
postage-stamp sized western European nation of Andorra.5 Perched atop
the Pyrenees Mountains, this spit of territory has intriguingly endured
for eight centuries as a successful political condominium. This note
attempts to explore this anomalous condominium as a permanent
political resolution to disputed territories in order to better understand
its governmental structure and to perhaps provide suggestion as to how
that structure may be employed in other disputed regions. Part I will
endeavor to create a working definition of condominium, with Part II
examining the two types of condominiums. Part III will then delve into
the history of condominium and its development in international law.
Part IV will examine the history of Andorra and the impetus for the
condominium solution in the territory, with Part V examining the
codification of the condominium solution in the modern Andorran
Constitution. Finally, part VI will examine why the Andorran
condominium has continued to last, with Part VII exploring the future
of the condominium solution on the global stage.
I. DEFINING CONDOMINIUM
As each regime of joint supremacy in a condominium is sui generis,
legal scholars have struggled for decades to come up with an adequate
definition of condominium.6 Accordingly, legal scholars have
promulgated a myriad of definitions in an attempt to directly define this
elusive concept.7 According to Hersch Lauterpaht, a condominium is a
2. See Joel H. Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in International Practice:
Reviving an Abandoned Concept of Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 727,
734 (2008).
3. Id. at 729 (noting several disputed territories around the world that could
potentially benefit from the Andorran model, including Gibraltar, Brcko in the former
Yugoslavia, the West Bank and Gaza, the Caspian Sea, the Barents Sea, the Orange
River, Jerusalem and Kashmir).
4. Id. at 730.
5. Andorra has an area of 175 square miles. Jacob Dolinger, Application, Proof, and
Interpretation of Foreign Law: a Comparative Study in Private International Law, 12 ARIZ.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 225, 239 (1995).
6. See O'Connell, supra note 1, at 81.
7. Vincent P. Bantz, The International Legal Status Of Condominia, 12 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 77, 89 (1998).
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territory "clearly under a division of sovereignty, or joint sovereignty, or
both."8 Arrigo Cavagleir held that a condominium arises when
demarcating a border would be too problematic; instead, the territory is
placed "pro invidiso under the contesting powers joint authority." Lassa
Oppenheim described a condominium as "a piece of territory consisting
of land or water . .. under the joint tenancy of two or more States, [with]
these several states exercising sovereignty conjointly over it, and over
the individuals thereon." 0 Max Sorensen opined that a condominium
existed when a territory had division of authority between two or more
states." Lastly, Marcel Sibert argued that a condominium exists when
"two or more states together exercise joint sovereignty on the same
territory, and such sovereignties mutually limit their activities, at least
in principle, on the grounds of legal equality."12
Other political writers have held that the idea of "joint sovereignty"
is a contradiction in terms because sovereignty is inherently
autonomous, thereby foreclosing the ability to hold sovereignty
collectively." To circumvent this conundrum, these writers instead
propose that a condominium is "one sovereignty whose attributes are
partitioned, or exercised by two Powers at different times and in respect
of different subjects and different subject matters."l4 However, this
definition too has been criticized for being too tautological; indeed,
critics have noted that its proponents have simply supplanted
"sovereignty" with "jurisdiction," mistaking separate jurisdiction with
joint jurisdiction."
The scholar Alfred Verdross may have come up with the most
productive definition of a condominium: "a condominium is a territory
placed under the joint authority of two or more states [condomini] and
thus subject to the different states rules, which have been issued by a
joint organ."'6 Under Verdross's explanation, a condominium territory
does not belong to each of the two states individually, but is "under the
joint jurisdiction of an international partial community." 7 Moreover,
states that are part of a condominium agreement are members of an
organization that was created by international agreement.' 8 Member
8. Id. at 89-90.
9. Id. at 90.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 81.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Bantz, supra note 7, at 96.
17. Id. at 97.
18. Id.
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States are legally equal, endowed with the equivalent rights and duties
as the other party states.1 9 Verdross argues that that this international
community of the condominium cannot be considered as joint territory;
indeed, if it were true joint authority then each Member State of the
condominium would deem the condominium territory to be its own. 20
Therefore, Verdross contends that it is inherent in the condominium
that no state can individually claim for itself enjoyment over the whole
condominium; instead, the organs of condominium government are
quintessentially international.21
Building on Verdross' characterization of a condominium, Alain
Coret promulgated a definition that has best captured the amorphous
nature of the condominium: "the status of a territory where the
enjoyment and exercise of the competences . . . belong to a partial
international community characterized by juridical and functional
equality of the member states; this community exercises its competences
with the help of particular international organs, immediate or
mediate."22
It is this lack of international competence that remains a defining
characteristic of condominiums, with a complete lack of autonomy on
the international stage.23 Characterized as an absence of an
"international personality," (defined as a state having purpose,
autonomous will, responsibility powers, an organization, and the
capacity to contribute to international law), condominiums have no
treaty-making power and cannot contribute in international norm
creation.24 Therefore, inherent in condominiums is an absence of an
international personality that is independent of the condominium
states, as only the condominium members, and not the territory, have
access to the international order.25 Indeed, international treaties and
negotiations are undertaken by the condomini as co-ruling states and
not as organs of the condominium community. 26 These condomini
always make joint decisions when it comes to international negotiations,
concluding the agreements in their own names, as the condominium
territory lacks either treaty-making capacity or power. 27
19. Id.
20. Id. at 97-98.
21. Id. at 98.
22. Id. at 99.
23. Id. at 147.
24. Id. at 100-01.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 147.
27. Id.
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II. THE TWO TYPES OF CONDOMINIUM SOLUTIONS
Condominiums have historically fallen into two subgroups
depending on the condominium's proximity to the condomini: frontier or
colonial. The frontier condominium occurs when the disputed territory
borders the condominium Member States. 28 Usually devised to resolve
border disputes between neighboring states, frontier condominiums can
be difficult to manage due to problems of currency crossings and
boundary flow. 29 Moreover, problems with citizenship, nationality, and
voter participation occur more often in frontier condominiums due to
minimal ethnic differences between the native condominium population
and the population of the two condomini.3 0 Because of a state's
contiguous frontier with the disputed territory, frontier condominiums
usually end with one of the condomini eventually incorporating the
disputed territory into its own borders.31 Due to this host of issues, a
frontier condominium generally fails to last as long as a colonial
condominium. 32
The classic example of the frontier condominium was found in a
small swath of territory known as Moresnet. Bordering Germany,
Belgium, and the Netherlands, this area was held in condominium from
1816 until 1919 by Prussia and the Netherlands.3 3 Arising from a
disputed 1815 border treaty between the Netherlands and Prussia that
had failed to expressly articulate who held the district of Moresnet,34
both the Netherlands and Prussia held competing interpretations of the
treaty favoring their own claim to the land.35 In 1816 the dispute was
resolved in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chappelle, an accord that established
the framework of condominium rule over the disputed territory.36 The
treaty created a governmental structure where legislative and executive
decisions would be administered collectively by both the Prussian and
Dutch states.37 However, although both the Prussian and Dutch States
held the executive and legislative branches collectively, the French Code
of the First Empire remained in force and could not be amended without
28. Samuels, supra note 2, at 734.
29. Id. at 735.
30. Id.
31. Jordie Saperia, Jerusalem: Legal Status, Condominium, and the Middle East
Peace, 3 JEAIL 175, 185 (2010).
32. Samuels, supra note 2, at 735.
33. Id. at 740.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 741.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the consent of both France and the Netherlands.38 Although two
commissioners who represented Prussia and the Netherlands initially
ruled the territory of Moresnet, the commissioners gradually granted
Moresnet a greater autonomy by appointing a mayor and allowing a
council to govern the district. 9 The indigenous population of Moresnet
was made up of citizens of both the sovereign countries.40 As citizens of
both France and the Netherlands, the natives of Moresnet were given
the ability to choose their country of allegiance for determining which
laws would apply to them.4 1 Accordingly, residents of Moresnet who
were subject to civil litigation could choose to have the venue be held in
either the Belgian Tribunal of Verivener or the Prussian Tribunal at
Aix-la-Chappelle.42 Although lasting for close to a century, the
condominium ceased to exist at the close of World War I, when the
Treaty of Versailles officially awarded the territory to Belgium in
1919.43
The second type of condominium is the colonial condominium; this
condominium shares no borders with the Member State. The colonial
condominium entered the political lexicon relatively recently, born in
the nineteenth century as a means for colonial powers to co-govern a
territory that both held claims to. 44 Because the co-sovereign does not
share natural borders with a colonial condominium, it becomes much
more difficult and more expensive to maintain colonial condominiums
than frontier condominiums. Consequently, colonial condominiums also
more often result in the indigenous population achieving self-rule.45
The paradigmatic example of a colonial condominium was found in
the West Pacific island chain of New Hebrides.4 6 With the discovery of
sandalwood on the islands in 1825,47 both Australian (and, by extension,
British) and French settlers flocked to the island chain. 48 After decades
of escalating tensions between the two nations, France and Great
Britain signed an accord in 1906 establishing a condominium over the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 741-42.
40. Id. at 742.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 742-43.
43. Id. at 743.
44. Id. at 734.
45. Saperia, supra note 31, at 185.
46. Interestingly, although New Hebrides remains a textbook example of a colonial
condominium, "condominium" was not mentioned in any of the constitutional documents
establishing the condominium. See O'Connell, supra note 1, at 78.
47. Id. at 71.
48. Bantz, supra note 7, at 120.
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archipelago. 49 By assuming joint jurisdiction over the islands, France
and Great Britain ruled over French and British nationals individually
but ruled over the indigenous population together.50 The treaty pledged
that France and Great Britain would not intervene separately in New
Hebrides, but only together, with their paramount rights combined to
guard against the potential arrival of a third power.51 The New
Hebrides judicial branch also reflected this joint rule, with the tri-
paneled judiciary comprised of one French judge, one British judge, and
one neutral third member.52 Financially, the tax revenue was divided
equally between France and Great Britain, with each state responsible
for the expense of their own administration.5 3 However, the French and
British governments paid for all essential government services jointly.54
The executive branch of New Hebrides was co-governed by the
British Resident Commissioner and French Resident Commissioner,
both of whom operated collectively in determining all major
resolutions.5 5 These laws would be enforced by the New Hebrides police
force, which was divided into two separate legions of British and French
policemen, with native officers serving on both forces.56 Each police force
was responsible for policing the actions of their own nationals, with the
cost of maintaining the force paid by each force's respective national
government.5 7 Each police force reported to the two national
Commandants, who in turn served under their country's respective
National Commissioner.55 Although the New Hebrides condominium
was able to endure for over seven decades, Britain's waning interest in
the island chain in the latter half of the twentieth century eventually
precipitated the termination of the condominium in 1979.59 With the
formation of the sovereign nation of Vantu shortly thereafter,6 0 New
Hebrides marked the last colonial condominium to achieve
independence. 6'
49. Samuels, supra note 2, at 737.
50. Id. at 738.
51. Bantz, supra note 7, at 121.
52. Samuels, supra note 2, at 738.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id at 738-39.
56. Id. at 739.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 739.
59. Bantz, supra note 7, at 122.
60. Saperia, supra note 31, at 185.
61. Samuels, supra note 2, at 735.
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III. THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE CONDOMINIUM
Employing the condominium solution as a resolution to a disputed
territory between two sovereign states has ancient origins, with the first
recorded example of a condominium occurring in the thirteenth century
BC.62 In the wake of a intensely brutal battle between the warring
empires of Egypt and Hatti in 1294 BC over a territory in modern day
Turkey, the Egyptian Pharaoh Ramses II and the Hittite King
Hattisulus III entered a treaty that not only pledged peaceful relations
between the belligerent parties, but also agreed to jointly cooperate in
controlling unruly subjects in Syria.63 Although little else is known
about this ancient treaty, 64 it remains the first example of a novel and
revolutionary concept within the province of international relations: two
states having joint sovereignty over a disputed territory.65
Although examples of condominiums on the international stage
have existed de facto since the time of the Ancient Egyptians, the
condominium, as a defined legal concept within international law, has
its origins in Roman civil law.66 Founded upon the Roman civil law
foundation of communion pro indivisio (undivided joint property), the
condominium property model was embraced by Italian scholars in the
Middle Ages and was gradually applied to international law as a model
for joint sovereignty and administration over a territory.67 Italian
scholars of civil law coined the word "condimius" to define this new
territorial concept, with the first written references to it appearing in
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 68 These Medieval academics
slowly spread international law and, with it, the concept of
condominium to the Germanic States and the rest of Western Europe.69
Consequently, condominiums appeared in the later stages of the Holy
Roman Empire, where they were employed to designate the joint
exercise of two sovereign princes' territorial rights over specific towns
and lands. 70 Viewed as a co-proprietorship or joint dominum, the term
was employed as a way of articulating feudal occupation of estates.71
62. Id. at 732.
63. Id. at 732-33.
64. Id. at 733 n.26.
65. See generally id. at 732-33.
66. Id. at 733.
67. Id.
68. P. Van Warmelo, Aspects of Joint Ownership in Roman Law, 25 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
RECHTSGESCHIEDENIS 123, 125 n.1 (1957).
69. See generally Samuels, supra note 2, at 733.
70. O'Connell, supra note 1, at 77.
71. Id.
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The nineteenth and early twentieth centuries would witness a
proliferation of condominiums on the international stage, as resource-
hungry and land-hungry European colonial powers were often pitted
against one another over a disputed territory. 72 Becoming a modus
vivendi between warring powers and featured prominently in the Treaty
of Vienna at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, the condominium
was perceived as a temporary solution to maintain the precarious
balance of power in Europe in the modern age.73 Notable condominiums
enacted during this period included New Hebrides (1906-1980) between
France and Great Britain; 74 Moresnet (1816-1819) between Prussia and
the Netherlands;75 Schleswig-Holstein (1855-1856) between Prussian
and Austria;76 Samoa (1889-1899) between Germany, Great Britain, and
the United States;77 and lastly Sudan (1898-1955) between Great
Britain and Egypt.78
Despite its regular employment during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the condominium solution faded into obscurity on
the international stage in the latter half of the twentieth century.7 9
Critics of the condominium solution would champion the Westphalian
notion of a state, 0 which held the principle of sovereignty to be
paramount,8 1 an "illimitable, indivisible, and exclusive form of public
power."82 Labeling the condominium solution as a "historical relic,"83
72. See generally id. at 77-78.
73. Samuels, supra note 2, at 733-34.
74. See generally Bantz, supra note 7, at 119-22.
75. See generally id. at 109-11.
76. See generally id. at 122-23.
77. Samuels, supra note 2, at 745-47.
78. Id. at 752-53.
79. Id. at 734. The lack of the use of the condominium solution in the latter half of the
twentieth century could also be partly attributed to the decolonization by Europe and Asia
following the Second World War.
80. The Westphalian Model was named after the eponymous Treaty of Westphalia, a
European peace accord drafted at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War in 1648. See
DAVID HELD ET. AL, GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICs, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 37
(1999) (noting of the Westphalian paradigm, "The model depicts the development of a
world order consisting of territorial, sovereign states in which there is no supreme
authority; states settle their differences privately and by force if necessary; they engaged
in diplomatic relations but otherwise there is minimal cooperation; they seek to place their
own (national) interest above all others; and they accept the logic of the principle of
effectiveness, that is, the principle that might eventually make right in the international
world-appropriation becomes legitimation.")
81. Josh Delbriuck, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal
Order: International Law in the Era of Globalization, 1 SZIER 1, 4 (2001).
82. DAVID HELD & ANTHONY McGREW, GLOBALIZATION/ANTI-GLOBALIZATION: BEYOND
THE GREAT DIVIDE 212 (2nd ed. 2007).
83. Samuels, supra note 2, at 730.
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critics pointed to the fact that the condominium solution was usually
enacted ag a temporary or emergency solution and a measure of last
resort.84 The critics further argued that this transitory nature would
make it difficult to establish a permanent solution in a condominium
territory.85 Moreover, critics argued that if two states were unable to
reach a peaceful compromise over a disputed territory, it was difficult to
imagine they would be able to cooperate in the daily administration of
the disputed territory.86 As a consequence of these criticisms and the
increasing emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of the state, the
western European country of Andorra remains one of the only
functioning political condominiums in the world.87
IV. THE HISTORY OF ANDORRA AND THE RISE OF THE CONDOMINIUM
SOLUTION
Located on a sliver of land wedged between Spain and France,88 the
territory of Andorra was fiercely fought over in the early Middle Ages
between the French Counts of Foix and the Spanish Bishops of Urgell.89
Although the origins of this dispute are somewhat opaque, historians
largely agree that it began when Louis the Pious, son of Charlemagne,
bestowed Andorra to the Count of Urgell in 819.90 The Count of Urgell
later traded Andorra to the Bishop of Urgell in exchange for other
adjacent fiefdoms.9 1 However, fearing that the bellicose Count of Urgell
would attempt to retake the traded land by force, the Bishop of Urgell,
in the eleventh century, granted Andorra in fief to the powerful Caboet
family to bolster military protection in the area. 92 Consequently, these
feudal privileges descended by marriage to the French Count of Foix in
84. Id.
85. Id. at 729.
86. Id. at 730.
87. See Jacco Bomhoff, The Reach of Rights: 'The Foreign" and "The Private" in
Conflict-of-Laws, State-Action, and Fundamental-Rights Cases With Foreign Elements, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 62 n.137 (2002).
88. Andorra's border with France was codified in the Treaty of Corbeil in 1258, and
Andorra's border with Spain was codified in an 1863 treaty. JORRI DUURSMA,
FRAGMENTATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF MICRO-STATES: SELF-
DETERMINATION AND STATEHOOD 316 n.1 (1996).
89. These disputes had resulted in "the slaughter of men, the destruction of castles, the
mutilation of men's bodies, and many other atrocities and almost unspeakable evils."
Derwent Whittlesey, Andorra's Autonomy, 6 J. MODERN HISTORY 147, 149 (1934) (quoting
the Acte de Par6age).
90. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 317.
91. See P. CHRIsTIAAN KLIEGER, THE MICROSTATES OF EUROPE: DESIGNER NATIONS IN
A POST-MODERN WORLD 29 (2013).
92. Id.
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1208.93 These Counts of Foix soon bridled against the lordship of the
Urgellian Bishop, sparking decades of warfare over control of Andorra.94
To resolve this ongoing dispute, both the French Count and Spanish
Bishop in 1278 agreed to a document known as the Acte de Parbage: 95
this treaty articulated that the French Counts of Foix and the Spanish
Bishop of Urgell would cease their belligerence,9 6 pledge to not
incorporate Andorra into their respective territories,9 7 and be granted
co-equal sovereignty over Andorra that they would administer in
concert.98 Under the aforementioned treaty, the French Counts of Foix
and the Bishop of Urgell would also each select an agent (Viguier) to
represent them in Andorra.9 9 Moreover, under the Act de Par6age, both
parties would receive fief payments (qidstia)oo from Andorran vassals
in alternating years, as well as be given the ability to recruit soldiers
from the general Andorran populace. 101 However, although given the
right of conscription, the co-sovereigns were proscribed under the Act
from employing Andorran soldiers against the other.102 Moreover, under
the Act, the co-sovereigns were each given the power to administer
justice jointly through bipartite civil justice panels (battles), with one
judge appointed by the Bishop and one appointed by the French co-
sovereign.103
93. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 317.
94. Id. The dispute was further compounded by the fact that the Counts of Foix
defended the Cathars, an anti-Romanist movement labeled as heretical by the Catholic
Church. For more information on this, see generally Klieger supra note 91, at 29-30.
95. This treaty came about through the intervention of the Bishop of Valencia, who
helped to mediate the accord. See DUURSMA supra note 88, at 317. Moreover, this treaty
was given Royal sanction by the King of Aragon as well as Papal approval by Pope Martin
IV in 1282. Joseph H. Rogatnick, Little States in a World of Powers: A Study of the
Conduct of Foreign Affairs by Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and San Marino 28 (May
1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania) (on file with Indiana
University Maurer School of Law).
96. Whittlesey, supra note 89, at 152-53.
97. Marc Maresceau, The Relations Between the EU and Andorra, in LAW AND
PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONs: SALIENT FEATURES OF A CHANGING LANDSCAPE
270, 273 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 2008).
98. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 28. Although the Act de Par6age stipulated that the
Count of Foix would remain a vassal of the Bishop in perpetuity, the Count ignored this
provision and in 1299 unilaterally repealed this portion of the act. Id. at 29.
99. Barry Taylor, Andorra, in 167 WORLD BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SERIES xiii, xiii (1993).
100. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 318. As of 1996, Andorrans still honored this ancient
act by giving the Bishop of Urgell 450 pesetas and the French President 960 francs. Id. at
318 n.15.
101. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 28-29.
102. Id. at 29.
103. Id. at 28.
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However, as feudalism was slowly supplanted by centralized nation-
states in the early modern era, the successors of the Andorran
suzerainty became enveloped into larger nation-states. 104 Accordingly,
in 1589, the French Counts transferred the right to the Andorran
territory to the French King,105 with this right later transferred to the
French State in 1870.106 Although the Bishopric of Urgell was later
merged into Catalonia and then into Spain,10 7 the Bishop of Urgell has
never transferred his joint sovereign right over Andorra. 08
Although the condominium that the Act de Par6age had established
remained largely undisturbed for over six centuries, 09 the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries brought fundamental changes to co-sovereignty
in Andorra. As the modernizing forces circulating through Europe in the
middle of the nineteenth century found their way into Andorra, they
precipitated a split of the Andorran populace between a conservative
pro-condominium party and a liberal party that advocated for more local
autonomy in governance.110 To mollify the feuding factions within the
country, in 1855 the Bishop of Urgell unilaterally promulgated an edict
granting greater autonomy to Andorrans.111 Calling for a "New Reform,"
the edict ceded to Andorrans the right to manage internal public
services.112 To accomplish this end, the edict established a
democratically elected deliberative body, 113 known as Consell General de
104. Whittlesey, supra note 89, at 153.
105. The French Counts' hereditary rights to lordship over Andorra would descend
through marriage to Henry of Navarre, who became King of France in 1589. See LEWIS
GASTON LEARY, ANDORRA: THE HIDDEN REPUBLIC 28 (1912).
106. See CARL WALDMAN & CATHERINE MASON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PEOPLES
21 (2006).
107. Whittlesey, supra note 89, at 153
108. Saperia, supra note 31, at 184. However, with the increasing centralization of
power under of the French co-sovereign, the Bishop of Urgell sought to elevate his title to
achieve parity with his Galician co-ruler; consequently, in 1633 the Bishop cavalierly
declared himself "Sovereign Prince of the Valleys of Andorra." Rogatnick, supra note 95, at
30.
109. Id. at 31. Indeed, as a visitor to Andorra observed of Andorra in 1900, "Andorra has
kept its medieval usages and institutions almost unchanged." KENNETH POMERANZ &
STEVEN TOPIK, THE WORLD THAT TRADE CREATED: SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND THE WORLD
EcONOMY 213 (2nd ed. 2006).
110. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 32. These modernizing forces that advocated for
liberal democracy were part of the "first wave of democratization," a movement that began
in the early nineteenth century and lasted until the mid-1920s. HELD ET. AL., supra note
80, at 46.
111. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 32-33.
112. Id. at 33.
113. Id. It should be noted that until 1933, only male heads of households were granted
suffrage. THOMAS ECCARDT, SECRETS OF THE SEVEN SMALLEST STATES OF EUROPE:
654
EDIFICATION FROM THE ANDORRAN MODEL
les Valls d'Andorra (Council General).11 4 Consisting of twenty-four
members (four representatives from each of the six parishes of
Andorra),115 the Council General administered internal public services;
these services included maintaining infrastructure, taxing imports,
judging appeals made by municipal and sub-municipal agencies, and
issuing passports.116 However, despite the newly expanded power of the
legislature, any decision made by the Council General would still be
subject to veto, singly or collectively, by the co-sovereigns."17 The French
co-sovereign, under pressure from forces calling for greater self-
determination in the governance of Andorra, acquiesced to signing this
edict in 1868.118
Even greater alterations to the Andorran condominium occurred at
the end of the twentieth century, as calls for self-determination by the
Andorran populace grew progressively louder. Faced with problems
caused by Andorra's nebulous legal order, the lack of codified laws, and
the ambiguity of delineation between different governmental organs,
the General Council in 1975 penned a letter to the co-sovereigns
requesting a reexamination of Andorran institutions.119 The co-
sovereigns granted the request, initiating an eighteen-year process of
internal governmental reforms.120 Part of these reforms was the
establishment in 1981 of an Executive Council, the predecessor to the
modern Andorran government.121 The head of this new established
Executive Council announced in 1990 his intention of promulgating an
Andorran Constitution, creating a tripartite commission-comprised of
two co-sovereigns as well as representatives of the General Counsel-to
draft the document.122 Unanimously approved by the General Counsel
ANDORRA, LIECHTENSTEIN, LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MONACO, SAN MARINO AND VATICAN
CITY 154 (2005). Women were granted the ballot in Andorra in 1970. Id. at 170.
114. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 33. However, Andorra had a quasi-deliberative body,
which predated the Council General, called the Council of Land; established in 1419, only
the heads of important families were granted membership. See ECCARDT, supra note 113,
at 152.
115. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 51.
116. Id. at 50.
117. Id. at 52.
118. Id. at 33.
119. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 320. Some writers have speculated that increased calls
for governmental reform were precipitated by the booming Andorran economy, resultant
from tourism and low taxes, as an increasingly affluent Andorran populace demanded
greater governmental autonomy. See Maresceau, supra note 97, at 275.
120. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 320.
121. Id. at 321.
122. Id. Many of the neighboring European states also vocally championed an Andorran
constitution in order to ensure codified rights for non-citizens and guest workers. See
KLIEGER, supra note 91, at 34. Indeed, non-citizens comprise 75% of Andorra's population.
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and endorsed by 74.2 percent of Andorran voters, the Andorran
Constitution became effective on May 4, 1993.123
V. THE CO-PRINCIPALITY OF ANDORRA AND THE MODERN ANDORRAN
CONSTITUTION
Enacted over seven centuries after the Act de Parbage established
joint rule over Andorra, the Andorran Constitution would finally codify
the condominium solution within article forty-three and forty-four. 124
Established as a parliamentary principality,125 the Andorran Charter
vests the Spanish Bishop of Urgell and the French State (personified by
the French President) as co-princes, jointly and divisibly Cap de l'Estat
(Chief of Staff) of Andorra.126 The Constitution explicitly articulates that
the powers between the two co-sovereigns are equal,127 vesting them
with "highest representation."128 Regularly informed of the affairs of the
state and immune from lawsuit,129 the co-princes arbitrate and
moderate the functioning of public authorities. 130 Interestingly, because
the French Constitution makes no reference to the president's
responsibility as co-prince of Andorra, there is no legal requirement that
the French president, as co-prince, make any attempt to conform his
Andorran policies to French law.131 Additionally, in the event of a
vacancy of one of the co-princes, the Constitution stipulates that power
be substituted with the laws of their respective organizations (i.e., the
French Constitution or Canon Law).132
Moreover, the co-princes appoint the Cap de Govern (Executive
Council President) following his or her election by the Andorran
Guy Olivier Faure & Patrick Klaousen, Andorra-European Community Trade Agreement
Negotiations, 1979-1987, in POWER AND NEGOTIATION 107, 110 (William Zartman &
Jeffery Z. Rubin eds., 2000).
123. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 321.
124. CONSTITUCIO D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 43-44. Indeed, even the state motto
seems to implicitly champion the condominium solution, trumpeting, "virtus unita fortiori"
or "A United Action is Much Stronger." ECCARDT, supra note 113, at 164. Prior to the
promulgation of the Andorran constitution, the rights of Andorrans were based on custom,
tradition, and established practices. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 47.
125. CONSTITUcl6 D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 1.
126. Id. at art. 43.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at art. 44.
130. Id.
131. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 345. Moreover, due to a treaty signed by both France
and Andorra, France may be prohibited from placing the French co-Prince in a position
that could jeopardize Andorran independence. Id.
132. CONSTITUCIO D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 49.
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Parliament. 133 Like the Viguer in medieval times, each co-prince
appoints an agent to represent him in Andorra.134 In a shift away from
the cost of the Andorran administration being indemnified through the
French and Spanish governments, the annual budget of Andorra now
allocates an equal amount to each of the co-princes commensurate with
the functioning of their services.135 The co-princes also have the power
to initiate any revision to the Constitution. 3 6 Additionally, the co-
princes have the power to veto any proposed law, treaty, or
governmental appointment. 137 Legislatively, the Andorran State has a
great degree of autonomy, having a unicameral legislature with
members elected by direct popular vote. 138 In addition to legislative
power, the General Council represents the Andorran people, authorizes
the state budget, and dictates the political actions of government. 39
However, as executives, signature by the co-princes are required to
promulgate any new law.140
The Andorran Constitution also introduced a number of reforms to
the judicial branch of Andorra. Instead of justice being dispensed in the
name of the co-princes, it is now administered in the name of the
Andorran people.141 More importantly, judges are no longer appointed
by the co-princes in the form of battles, but are instead appointed by the
newly constituted Supreme Council of Justice.142 This High Court of
Justice, in turn, is composed of five members: one member appointed by
each of the co-princes, one by the General Council, one by the Head of
the Government, and one by the judges. 143 The Constitutional Tribunal,
which has advisory jurisdiction, is composed of four judges: one
appointed by each of the co-princes, and two appointed by the General
Council.
Although there have been substantial changes to the legislature and
judiciary, the external relations of Andorra still remain in the province
133. Id. at art. 73.
134. Id. at art. 48.
135. Id. at art. 47. This constitutional provision changes the funding for the co-princes;
prior to the Constitution's codification, the French President and the Bishop of Urgell
were indemnified for their expenses from the French and Spanish government
respectively. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 322.
136. CONSTITUCIO D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 105.
137. Thomas D. Grant, Between Diversity and Disorder: A Review of Jorri C. Duursma,
Fragmentation and the International Relations of Micro-States: Self-Determination and
Statehood, 12 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 629, 669 (1997).
138. See generally CONSTITUcIO D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, tit. IV.
139. Id. at art. 50.
140. Grant, supra note 137, at 669.
141. CONSTITUC6 D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 85, § 1.
142. Id. at art. 89, § 3.
143. Id. at § 2.
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of the co-princes. As Chief of Staff, the co-princes are vested with
establishing diplomatic relations with other states and with entering
foreign treaties. 144 Indeed, under article 44 of the Andorra Constitution,
the document entrusts the co-princes with the sole authority to
maintain the international personality, noting, "They express the
consent of the Andorran State in honoring its international obligations,
in accordance with the Constitution."145
Although the Constitution stipulates that international relations
are still conducted through the co-princes, the subsequent Treaty of
Vicinage between Spain, France, and Andorra has qualified the extent
of this power. Enacted in 1993, the treaty codifies Andorra's ability to
establish an international personality, with the signatories expressly
recognizing Andorra as a sovereign state. 146 Under this treaty, France
and Spain may not impede Andorra's participation in international
meetings and organization. 147 However, Andorra's autonomy in
international diplomacy is encumbered in two ways: first, Andorra must
adhere to international conventions to which France or Spain is also a
party. 148 Secondly, Andorra must respect the "fundamental interest" of
both Spain and France and must to cooperate in the settlement of any
issues that concern such fundamental interests. 149 Despite these two
restrictions, by negotiating with Andorra as a sovereign state, France
and Spain have both implicitly and explicitly recognized and sanctioned
Andorra's international personality on the world stage. Indeed, both
Spain and France have recognized the independence of Andorra, with
both states establishing diplomatic relations with Andorra in 1993.150
However, despite the fact that Andorra gained admission to the United
Nations in 1993 and the Council of Europe in 1994, neither body has
held discussions on whether Andorra constitutes an independent
state. 151
144. KLIEGER, supra note 91, at 34. It should be noted that although the president of the
French Republic acting in his capacity as co-prince of Andorra signs a treaty on behalf of
Andorra, it does not also bind France to that treaty. Stephen Eliot Smith, Uncharted
Waters: Has the Cook Islands Become Eligible for Membership in the United Nations, 8
N.Z. J. PUB. & INT'L L. 169, 208 (2010).
145. CONSTITUCI6 D'ANDORRA, 28 April 1993, art. 44.
146. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 335. Interestingly, because the French constitution did
not consider the prospect of the president being the head of two separate states
simultaneously, France was initially forced to delay recognition of Andorra's statehood.
Faure & Klaousen, supra note 122, at 125 n.1.
147. DUURSMA, supra note 88, at 336.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 338.
151. Grant, supra note 137, at 671.
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VI. EXPLANATIONS FOR WHY THE CONDOMINIUM SOLUTION IN ANDORRA
HAS REMAINED
Andorra remains an anomaly in the political realm, indefatigably
continuing the condominium solution over the centuries while most
other condominiums have failed within a few years. Andorra's enduring
condominium solution therefore begs the question of why a solution that
is largely regarded as a temporary fix has had such atypical longevity.
An initial explanation on the endurance of Andorra's condominium
solution is that Andorra is not the anomaly of the condominium
solution, as Andorra is not in fact a condominium per se: indeed, where
other condominiums have traditionally involved two sovereign states,
Andorra involves one sovereign state (France), while the other co-ruler
is embodied in the Bishop of Urgell, an ecclesiastical leader not directly
affiliated with Spain.152 This point was highlighted in the case of Drozd
and Janousek v. France and Spain, where a European tribunal held
that Andorra was not a Franco-Spanish condominium."s3 Unlike
condominiums per se between two actual states, which have historically
only lasted for a few decades, Andorra arguably boasts only one true
state and, therefore, really only one state authority: France. As
Commissaire du Gouvernement Odent noted in Radio Andorre, "Since
the mitre of Urgell, the other suzerain, does not have any international
existence, it necessarily ensues that France, and France alone, bears
international responsibility for the Valleys of Andorra."154 Moreover,
152. Saperia, supra, note 31, at 188. The argument can be made, however, that because
the Holy See-the governing body of the Vatican City-State-appoints the Bishop of
Urgell, the Bishop is actually a representative for the Vatican City-State, thereby
satisfying the classic definition of joint sovereignty by two states. See Grant, supra note
137, at 670-71. However, the counterargument is that the Holy See exercises no
continuing authority over the Bishop as co-prince, but instead the Holy See only has the
ability to appoint and elevate the Bishop within the Church hierarchy. Id. at 670 n.248.
Additionally, some have argued that although the Bishop of Urgell is institutionally
separate from Spain, due to the Bishop of Urgell being a Spanish citizen residing in Spain,
the Spanish Bishop acts as a de facto proxy for Spain. See Faure & Klaousen, supra note
122, at 111.
153. The case involved two Andorran thieves who were tried and convicted in an
Andorran court. As Andorra had no prison facilities, the defendants were sent to France
where they subsequently filed suit alleging their trial violated the European Convention
on Human Rights, signed by both France and Spain. The court held that there was no
jurisdiction to hear the claim, as Andorra had not been a signatory to the convention and
was not a Franco-Spanish condominium. Moreover, the court found that although the co-
princes had appointed Andorran judges together, they failed to act in their national
capacity as French and Spanish judges and were therefore not subject to the supervision
of France or Spain. Barbara Miltner, Revisiting Extraterritoriality After Al-Skeini The
ECHR and Its Lessons, 33 MICH. J. INT'L L. 693, 734 (2012).
154. Bantz, supra note 7, at 105.
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because France remains the only state within the Andorran
condominium, the condominium does not face the same problems of
nationalistic hubris and jingoistic foreign policy that can exacerbate and
escalate tension over a disputed territory between two competing states.
Additionally, some writers have also speculated that the local
Andorran's adroit political diplomacy of pitting one co-sovereign against
the other-thereby maintaining a balance of power-has ensured the
condominium's longevity.155
A second theory as to why the condominium solution in Andorra has
continued to endure is because Andorra has few natural resources,156
little arable land, 57 and, due to its proximity in the Pyrenees
Mountains, is highly isolated. 55 Consequently, these negative
characteristics have rendered Andorra undesirable to its neighbors.
Unlike the disputed territory of Kashmir that has been partly fought
over by both Pakistan and India for being the location for the start of
the Indus River, Andorra boasts few desirable resources for the
condominium members. Indeed, it is telling of Andorra's relative
insignificance to neighboring states that, since the Acte de Par6age in
1278, Andorra's condominium has only once been truly in jeopardy,'5 9
remaining unmarred by war for the last seven centuries. 16 0
155. See Maresceau, supra note 97, at 273-74. Indeed, Andorra has a long tradition of
strict neutrality, with a Manuel Digest in 1748 promulgating the aphorism that Andorra
should always remain neutral in case of war between France and Spain. DUURSMA, supra
note 88, at 335.
156. See POMERANZ & TOPIK, supra note 109, at 213.
157. Due to the mountains terrain of Andorra, only about 4% of the land is arable.
Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 18. Indeed, in 1990, this amounted to 1,000 hectares, upon
which the staple crops of tobacco and potatoes are grown. See Taylor, supra note 99, at xiv.
158. Due to its isolation, travelling to Andorra can pose a challenge: it lacks an airport
or train station, and the nearest city of Toulouse is over a two-hour drive away. Pat
Thompson, Why Andorrans Live Longer than Everyone Else, CNN (April 23, 2009, 7:16
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/04/23/andorra.life.expectancy/index.html. As the
Andorran President commented to the U.N. assembly on Andorra's isolation from the rest
of Europe, "less than a century ago it was only possible to arrive in Andorra on horse."
U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., 11th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/58/PV.11 (Sept. 25, 2003).
Indeed, the first roadway into Andorra was not constructed until 1913. Rogatnick, supra
note 95, at 22. However, interestingly enough, although Andorra's relative isolation seems
to be an undesirable characteristic to its neighbors, its rustic and remote lifestyle has
resulted in its inhabitants boasting one of the highest life expectancies in the world. See
Thompson, supra note 158.
159. The Andorran condominium was only once placed in jeopardy during the French
Revolution in 1793: as the French revolutionaries refused to accept the quiesta because of
its feudal origin, the French co-sovereign technically temporarily suspended its tributary
relationship with Andorra. Rogatnick, supra note 95, at 30. However, Napoleon, ever the
lover of tiny states, reinstated the co-sovereignty in 1806. Id.
160. POMERANZ & TOPIK, supra note 109, at 213.
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A third and final theory of why the condominium solution has
succeeded in Andorra where it has failed in many other disputed
territories is its lack of cultural influence and power.161 Unlike the
disputed territory of Gaza that is desired and claimed by both the
Palestinians and Israelis due to its rich cultural, historical, and
religious heritage, Andorra has historically been relatively remote and
unimportant in international affairs and has not held enough real
political, religious, or historical significance over either France or Spain
to warrant precipitating a dispute.162
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE CONDOMINIUM SOLUTION AS A LASTING
RESOLUTION TO DISPUTED TERRITORIES
In spite of the absence of condominium solutions on the world stage
today, excepting Andorra, the possibility of viable similar political
arrangements in international disputes is not foreclosed. As Hersch
Lauterpacht, a leading international relations scholar, noted on the
viability of condominiums, "There is nothing in the legal theory or in the
nature of sovereignty to render impossible a permanent and agreed
division of sovereignty as suggested by the nature of a condominium."16 3
Indeed, in the last century, the stress on the paramount importance of
absolute sovereignty in international relations has been deemphasized,
as states have begun reevaluating their traditional Westphalian
conceptions of sovereignty.
This reassessment of the Westphalian paradigm began in the early
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as industrial and technological
revolutions, coupled with the rapid growth of international markets, led
states to create new international mechanisms to govern global
affairs.164 To cope with the novel challenges of an increasingly
interconnected and interdependent world, European states established
intergovernmental collective regimes such as the International
Telegraph Union and the Universal Postal Union to administer and
regulate interstate territory.165 This movement away from the
Westphalian model toward a collective governmental model accelerated
during the early twentieth century. In the wake of the First and Second
World Wars the staggering devastation precipitated an increasing
acceptance that the traditional "balance of power" paradigm in
international governance was inadequate to contend with the rapidly
161. See Saperia, supra note 31, at 188.
162. Id.
163. Samuels, supra note 2, at 728.
164. See Delbrilck, supra note 81, at 4.
165. Id.
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changing political landscape.166 Indeed, following the unprecedented
devastation wrought by the Second World War, states became
increasingly cognizant that, if the most extreme crimes against
humanity were to be proscribed, a new governance paradigm would be
required.167
This paradigm would manifest itself at the end of World War II with
the creation of the United Nations. Established for the purpose of
collectively regulating and administering an international territory, the
United Nations was constituted as a community of states with equal
voting rights through a General assembly.168 Under its Charter, the
United Nations was vested with the responsibility for maintaining
international peace and security, endowing the U.N. Security Council
with the ability to intercede in the internal affairs of Member States.
Significantly, the United Nations Charter also expressly proscribed any
Member States from using or threatening to use force.169 By prohibiting
a state's liberium ius ad bellum or ability to go to war-a right held to
be a fundamental tenet of the Westphalian model of sovereignty-it
marked a tectonic shift in the concept of sovereignty on the world
stage. 170 More importantly, as the United Nations continues to present
an alternative model that challenges the Westphalian paradigm of
global governance and traditional geopolitics, it illustrates the viability
of an intergovernmental community governed and administered
through collective decision-making.171
Nowhere has the practicability of states pooling their sovereignty to
constitute an international community been more exemplified than in
the European Union. First created in embryonic form by six European
states under the name of the European Community in 1952, it was
established as an international mechanism to create a single market
and supranational authority over the regulation of coal and steel in
Member States.172 Six year later, the Rome Treaties established the
166. See HELD ET AL., supra note 80, at 62.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 63. Admittedly, however, there is a distinct difference between the United
Nations and the condominium solution; although the UN has ostensibly equal voting
rights, some states remain more equal than others, with powerful nations afforded a veto
power on any legislation via the UN Security Council. Id.
169. See Delbriick, supra note 81, at 7.
170. Id.
171. See HELD ET AL., supra note 80, at 65. Indeed, the UN has aided in the
development of collective regulation of international public goods such as "international
air traffic control, telecommunication, control of contagious diseases, humanitarian relief
for refugees and victims of natural disasters and the protection of the environmental
commons." Id.
172. KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21344, EUROPEAN UNION
ENLARGEMENT 2 (2013).
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European Economic Community, an international organization that
extended this common market idea to all economic sectors, 173 as well as
creating the European Energy Community to monitor the use of nuclear
energy among the Member States. In 1967, these three communities
would become consolidated into one organization, collectively becoming
the European Community.174 Over the successive decades, more
European states would join the European Community, voluntarily
ceding part of their sovereignty to share in the political and economic
benefits flowing from joint governance. To achieve even greater political
and economic integration among its Member States, in November of
1993 the Maastricht Treaty was enacted, establishing the current
European Union. 175
As the European Union is a network of states that have pooled their
own sovereignty to jointly govern a territory,17 6 it stands as testament to
the viability of the condominium solution. In David Held's description of
the voluntary transfer of sovereignty from the European Member State
to the European Union, analogies can immediately be drawn to the
condominium solution: "By creating a community of unlimited duration,
having its own institutions . . . and, more particularly, real powers
stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from
the state to the community, the member states have limited their
sovereign rights."1 7 7 With European Member States voluntarily joining
an international collective and pooling their sovereignty to co-govern a
territory, the European Union can be conceptualized as a macro-version
of the condominium solution on a global scale. Moreover, far from
weakening the individual states that have joined in this European
Community by voluntarily ceding some of their sovereignty, the
European Union has instead served to strengthen its constituent states
against the power of the United States and an ascending China. 178
In a globalized world that is increasingly interconnected and
interdependent, the latter half of the twentieth century has arguably
witnessed the emergence of a post-Westphalian order. 179 Ironically, it is
the same European states that helped to promote and cement the notion
of absolute sovereignty as the chief characteristic of the state in the
treaty of Westphalia that have begun to dismantle this principle
through their voluntary membership in international governmental
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See HELD ET AL., supra note 80, at 74.
177. Id. at 74.
178. Id. at 74.
179. Id. at 441.
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collectives. Indeed, with the rise of international collectives such as the
United Nations and the European Union, legal scholars are redefining
sovereignty and autonomy to reflect the new post-Westphalian world
order. 80 Accordingly, international law has begun to acknowledge this
tectonic shift in the notion of sovereignty, with a new proposal of
sovereignty defined as "membership in reasonably good standing in the
regimes that make up the substance of international life . . .
Sovereignty, in the end, is status-the vindication of the states
existence as a member of the international system."' 8' Truly, in this
collectivized age of the United Nations and the European Union, it is
not the condominium solution, with its idea of an international
community of pooled sovereignty, that is the "historical relic";182 instead,
it is the critics of the condominium solution-those who obstinately
cling to the outmoded Westphalian notion of sovereignty in the face of a
fundamentally changed global landscape-who remain the artifacts of a
bygone era.
CONCLUSION
Arising as a solution to a war over a disputed territory over three
millennia ago, the popularity of the condominium solution has ebbed
and flowed throughout the centuries. Revived as a legal concept of joint
rule in the nineteenth century as a way for colonial powers to settle
disputes over territory, in the latter half of the twentieth century it
would once again fall out of vogue in political circles. Denounced by
some critics as being antithetical to the conception of the modern state
due to the Westphalian primacy of absolute sovereignty, the
condominium solution has all but disappeared from the modern political
lexicon. Branded as a modern anachronism and a relic of the feudal era,
critics have pointed to what they see as the condominium solution's
inherently temporary nature, thereby foreclosing the possibility of
employing it as permanent resolution to a disputed territory.
Yet, despite the torrent of criticism the condominium solution has
received from political and legal scholars, the condominium has
180. See Delbrfick, supra note 81, at 20.
181. Id.
182. Interestingly, some scholars do not view "medieval" as a pejorative term; indeed,
Bull argues that in a global order characterized by overlapping spheres of power, it is
useful to conceptualize the present era as a secular 'heo-medieval world order." HELD ET
AL., supra note 80, at 85-86. As Bull analogizes the medieval era to the current global
system, "In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over
a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals
underneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor
above." Id.
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stubbornly endured for over eight centuries in Andorra. Formed as a
modus vivendi between the French Counts of Foix and the Bishop of
Urgell, the condominium solution in Andorra continues to be a tangible
testament to the viability of the condominium as a permanent solution.
Although it is possible that the condominium solution in Andorra is sui
generis due to Andorra arguably not being a condominium per se, a
dearth of natural resources, isolation, or lack of cultural significance,
the fact remains that Andorra remains an enduring power-sharing
solution over a disputed territory between two authorities. More
importantly, as the world enters into a post-Westphalian order and
begins to place less importance on absolute sovereignty by joining
international communities of pooled sovereignty, it may represent the
potential for the condominium solution to once again be revived as a
conceivable solution to disputed territories around the world.

